In Korea's high-growth economy, the Bank ofKorea had been willing to tolerate doubledigit inflation, provided that it remained at 'non-explosive' levels. In this article, we estimate a monetary policy feedback rule for Korea and find that the upper threshold of tolerable inflation for the Bank of Korea was about 20 percent. It appears that the Bank of Korea's disciplined, rule-like approach to monetary policy was able to control inflation and keep it away from explosive levels, despite the well-know empirical regularity that inflation becomes more variable at higher levels. After 1983, however, our regime-switching model suggests that the inflation target has been six percent. We also find little evidence that the Bank of Korea has targeted real growth, except for a period in the mid-1980s when industrial production growth suggested that the economy was overheating, relative to an implicit growth target of 7.4 percent. We conclude with a discussion of possible reasons for Korea to choose to stabilize inflation at lower levels since the mid-1980s.
Introduction
In response to the growing consensus in favor of price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, economists have proposed a number of feedback mechanisms aimed at committing policy to a long-run nominal target [McCallum (1988 [McCallum ( , 1994 ; Judd and Motley (1993) ]. The proposed feedback mechanisms prescribe changes in an operating target variable that the central bank can control. Much empirical work has concentrated on simulations of feedback rules in order to learn about their properties [McCaIlum (1988 [McCaIlum ( , 1994 ; Judd and Motley (1993) ]. The procedure can be inverted, however, to use policy feedback rules as models of policy and the associated data [Dueker and Fischer (1996) ]. In this article, we use a feedback rule to examine the implicit policy targets of the Bank of Korea and to examine whether Korean monetary policy behaved in a disciplined, rule-like manner, even though its implicit inflation target was well above the levels seen in other countries that have explicit inflation targets.
The Bank of Korea's delicate mission for the first half of our 1973-95 sample was to allow rapid growth in domestic credit to foster growth, while keeping inflation just below an explosive level at which inflation could easily spiral upward to hyperinflation. In general, monetary policy in Korea has been encharged with accommodating Korea's impressive growth, even to the point of shepherding growth in targeted sectors by using its influence on private banks to direct loans and investment capital. As the Korean economy developed, government policymakers recognized that sustained growth would require a more advanced 2 and less regulated financial system. In addition, an efficient financial system would only evolve in~tnenvironment of lower inflation, below double digits. Our results suggest that Korea's monetary policy was perhaps surprisingly disciplined and rule-like in pursuit of objectives that underwent a transition to lower inflation in the early to middle 1980s.
The next sections briefly review strategies and institutional detail for the Bank of Korea.
The subsequent sections present the empirical model and results.
Strategies of the Bank of Korea
For the past 50 years, the Bank of Korea has consistently concerned itself with fostering Korea's rapid economic growth and development [Bank ofKorea (1995) ]. Towards this end, however, the contribution of monetary policy has alternated between accommodative and stabilizing stances with respect to price inflation. In this period, monetary policy did not use the exchange rate as an indicator variable, because the exchange rate was not market-determined but controlled by the authorities to prevent undesired exchange rate appreciations from making Korean exports less competitive in the world market. During the late 1950s, monetary policies were aimed at alleviating the high inflation rates that prevailed after the Korean War. From the early 1960s when the first economic development plan began, monetary policy was frequently used to speed up economic growth by increasing the growth rate of the money supply and directing financial resources to targeted sectors in export industries. In the 1970s, especially, the government encouraged hurried expansion in the heavy and chemical industries to sustain a high rate of economic growth.
Monetary authorities in this period were deeply involved in mobilizing financial resources to accommodate large rates of investment in these industries [Bank of Korea (1992) ]. One reason for the high inflation seen in Korea was that Korea often experienced large current account surpluses that the Bank of Korea could hardly offset to prevent rapid growth in the money supply [Bank of Korea (1990) ]. Because of the high resulting inflation, financial deregulation was postponed.
The export-oriented growth strategy of the 1960s and 1970s led to high inflation and the realization that such levels of monetary stimulus actually undermined the country's capacity utilization and financial development. Moreover, the second oil shock in 1979 drove Korean economy into stagflation. At the stage of the economy's development in the early 1980s, the Korean government recognized that sustained growth would require financial liberalization, and lower inflation was essential for successful financial liberalization. Thus, although sustainable economic growth remained the chief goal of overall economic policy, price stabilization became the best contribution that monetary policy could make. It is generally acknowledged that financial deregulation and the opening of financial markets have enhanced Korea's market mechanisms since the mid-1980s. During the 1980s, all existing commercial banks were privatized and some new commercial banks received charters. Interest rate liberalization progressed and the domestic stock market was partially opened to foreign investors in the early 1990s. Reflecting the change in monetary policy objectives in Korea from economic growth to price stabilization, the growth rate of money supply was much lower in the 1980s than in the 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Figure 1 .
4
In order to tackle the problem of high inflation while accommodating rapid economic growth, the Bank of Korea has adopted monetary targeting. A target growth rate for M2 has been set at the beginning of each year since 1979.1 Since interest rates were not market-determined until Korea began to pursue interest rate liberalization in 1991, they
were not good indicators of the stance ofmonetary policy. 2 For most of the post-war period, credit was rationed, with interest rates held below market-clearing levels. But non-price credit rationing has been fading and interest rates have become a more important tool of monetary control in recent years.
From 1979 to 1985, the target growth rate of M2 continued to decrease from 25% to 9.5%, bringing a substantial tightening in monetary policy. Subsequently the M2 target rate was raised to 16-18% during the period of hugh current account surplus (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , but has gradually been reduced to 12-16% in 1995. The target growth rate for M2 has been determined largely by the European Community method of using estimates ofpotential real growth, unavoidable near-term inflation and expected velocity growth and deriving implied money growth from the equation of exchange. 3 Table 1 shows how close actual M2 growth has been to the target rates since 1979. With the exception of 1983 and 1984, actual M2 'Monetary targeting formally began in 1976 when the Bank of Korea announced growth targets for Ml. Before that time, the Bank also had to agree to targets for growth in the monetary base and domestic credit as part of Stand-By credit agreements with the International Monetary Fund, but these did not guide monetary policy actions operationally.
2 Barro and Lee (1994) argue, however, that Korean interest rates nevertheiss fluctuated around equilibrium levels, based on the reduced-form regressions they study. 3 For example, the 1995 M2 target growth rate of 12-16% was calculated based on an assumption of 7% real growth, 5% unavoidable inflation, and a decline in velocity of 2%. In recent years, the target range has been widened due to increased uncertainty about the effects of financial market liberalization and the opening of the country's capital markets.
growth has been within or above the target range. In the early 1980s, M2 growth targets were set~bove 20% to counteract the economic recession. In the middle of the 1980s, the central bank did not completely sterilize the monetary expansion resulting from the large accummulation of current account surplus. The fact that actual M2 growth has not been particularly constrained by the target ranges set at the beginning of each year suggests that the money supply has responded to intra-year developments, perhaps in a manner akin to the feedback mechanism we present in the next section. 
Institutional Details for the Bank of Korea

An Empirical Model of Korean Monetary Policy
In our empirical work, we assume that the Bank of Korea steers M2 growth with inflation as its ultimate nominal target. In this case forecasts of real money demand provide an important link between the operating target and the policy objective. We use a time- It should also be noted that our Kalman filter forecasts use data only up to the current date in estimating the coefficient values, in contrast to OLS coefficients which embody sample-wide information. In addition to a current-period inflation target, our model allows for the possibility that monetary policy responds to a deviation in the price level from an implicit target price level and also to a deviation in the industrial production index and an implicit target level. As discussed above, monetary policy cannot achieve arbitrary targets for real variables, such as industrial production, in the long run, but monetary policy can take short-term feedback from real variables. We included feedback from industrial production, because the Bank of Korea has shown concern not only with helping to sustain Korea's high growth rate, but also with stabilizing some of the volatility in the growth rate. Since monetary policy cannot choose arbitrary targets for real variables in the long run, our model feedback mechanism allows the industrial production index to have an implicit target, where the target is adjusted gradually to accommodate actual long-run developments.
We note M2 growth as /.~lnM2,the price level as P, a forecast of growth in real M2
demand as z~ln(M/P),the target inflation rate as~, the industrial production index as IP and the desired price level and industral production level as P and IF, respectively. The variance of the error term is not assumed to be constant to reflect the fact that the model will not describe the data with equal precision in all time periods:
var(ft) = cr2 (53) The target paths for the price level and industrial production index evolve according to equations (2) and (4):
Expected target:
Target md. Prod: 1riITi~P(S2~)= ,i(S2~)+ 8 2 (S2~)lnIP~~i + (1 6 2 (S2~))1nIP~_ 1 ,
The variables~and 17~are, respectively, the target price level and the target level for the industrial production index conditional on particular values of the markov state variables.
The expected values are derived by integrating out the current values of the state variables.
Rebasing of the target level occurs for values of 5j, 82 < 1. Consequently, one-time shifts in the price level are gradually accommodated into the target path. As 8 decreases from one, the degree to which the target level is allowed to drift to accommodate recent developments increases. McCallum (1993) has used an analogous weighting scheme; however, in his model 5~remains constant.
Because of the autoregressive nature of equations (2) and (4), inferences of the state at time t would depend on the entire history of past realizations of the state variables if it were not for the collapsing procedure shown in equations (3) and (5). Kim (1994) provides the justification for the collapsing procedure and notes that its use introduces a small approximation to the evaluation of the likelihood function in a markov-switching model. He finds, however, that the approximation does not materially affect the calculated value of the likelihood function or the parameter estimates.
The three Markov processes are assumed to undergo transitions between their states independently from each other for reasons of tractability. In this case, the transition probabilities can be summarized as
Note that without the independence assumption, we would have to estimate 64 transition probabilities instead of six. The unconditional value of Si = 0, for example, is
1-gi 2-pi-qi
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximizing the log of the expected likelihood or
where Y~4is information available through time t -1 and the student-t densities are
and F is the gamma function.
Empirical Results for Korea
The two-state Markov switching characterization of the Bank of Korea's implicit inflation target uncovers estimates of six percent inflation in the low state and slightly greater than twenty percent in the high state. 5 Table 2 contains the full set of parameter estimates 'Note that the two-state characterization is not as restrictive as it might first appear, because the states are only inferred probabilistically. Thus, the inferred inflation target can lie anywhere between six and twenty percent, depending on the filtered probability of being in the low-inflation state.
for the model and Figure 1 shows the probability-weighted inferred inflation target with a one-year moving average of actual inflation. The Bank of Korea has been in the lowinflation state since the early i980s, in conformity with the world-wide disinflation. For a period in the mid-i980s, actual inflation remained substantially under six percent. Our estimates suggest that part of this differential in the mid-1980s may have resulted from attempts to prevent the real economy from overheating. Figure 2 plots the probability of being in the state in which money growth admits a low level (essentially zero) of feedback from the industrial production index. The non-zero feedback state P~2(S2= 1) = .084) pertained in the mid-1980s. Figure 3 shows that moderate feedback was taken when the industrial production index was generally racing ahead of a path defined by a growth path of~(S2 = 1) = 7.4 percent. For this reason, we conclude that the mid-i980s represented the only period in the sample when the Bank of Korea responded directly to concerns that the Korean economy was overheating due to unsustainably fast growth in industrial production. Log-Likelihood 14-452.72 -452.73 No. of parameters 21 15 Note: Standard errors in parentheses for restricted model.
The parameter estimates of A~find no evidence of Korean monetary policy admitting feedback~fromthe price level, which implies that the inflation rate is targeted period by period. Figure 4 plots the filtered probability of the low volatility state. In this state, the residual variance is low: a~= cx 2 (S3 = 0) = .441. The residual variance between monthly M2 growth and the model-implied rate of M2 growth is about five times higher in the high-variance state, o~= a 2 (S3 = 1) = 2.28. Figure 4 shows that high-volatility periods are not persistent and are distributed quite evenly throughout the sample period.
Finally in Figure 5 , we assess the fit of the feedback model in explaining Korea's M2 growth. The estimation was carried out using monthly data, but for clarity the chart plots year-over-year growth rates. The chart shows much wider swings in M2 growth prior to the mid-1980s, after which M2 growth has settled at a mean rate near 15 percent. The modelimplied M2 growth rate declined more slowly than actual M2 growth in the disinflation of the 1980s. We would expect, however, the model-based inferences to be conservative when identifying major changes in the inflation target, given that the high-inflation state is highly persistent, with q 1 = .996. In this case, the model will have to see below-normal inflation for a substantial period before concluding that the target rate of inflation has fallen. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the inflation rate and money growth fell more rapidly in 1983 than the Bank of Korea had expected. monetary policy ... one might even go so far as to say that the high inflation rates of the past destroyed the very basis of the existence of inflation by drawing the attention of the financial markets to the dangers of an easier monetary policy." [Issing 1996, pp. 290-91] .
Of course, disinflation took place globally in the early 1980s, so more than Korea's nascent domestic financial markets were pointing towards disinflation. 
